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the release itself was the cause of the injury. Petitioners have
presented no evidence as to any claims Mrs. Keel may have had,
whether or not filed with her employer. While we can surmise
that Mrs. Keel suffered from the prospect of being unemployed, in
order to decide the issue before us, we must ascertain the intent
of her employer in making the lump-sum payment to her.
The amount of the lump-sum payment was calculated on a
number of weeks of service and Mrs. Keel's salary. The release
states that if Mrs. Keel were rehired by IBM, she could be
required to repay some portion of the lump-sum payment based on
the number of weeks off the IBM payroll compared with the number
of weeks' salary used to calculate the lump-sum payment. As in
Sodoma v. Commissioner, supra, and Webb v. Commissioner, supra,
the lump-sum payment herein appears to have been severance pay
rather than a payment for personal injury. Severance pay, just
like the pay it replaces, is taxable income.
Finally, we note that aside from the assertion in their
memorandum brief in respect of the claimed personal injuries, see
supra pp. 7-8, we are furnished with no clue as to the nature of
the claimed injuries. It goes without saying that an assertion
on brief is not evidence. Moreover, even if we were to treat it
as the equivalent of testimony by Mrs. Keel, it would not be
sufficient to satisfy petitioners' burden of proof. See Kurowski
v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1989-149 (where the Court of Appeals specifically found
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