- 11 - definition for this case, and, we believe, it describes a portion, if not all, of both the special severance payment offered to petitioner and the payment. Special severance payments were determined under a schedule generally applicable to laid off employees, based on years of service and base salary. That is enough for us to find that at least a portion of each special severance payment was severance pay. We assume that each special severance payment was also made in consideration of the various releases contained in each of the separation agreements. We need not determine, however, what portion of the consideration in each special severance payment--and, in particular, the special severance payment offered to petitioner--was attributable to such releases because petitioner does not argue (nor would we find based on the evidence in this case) that any of the amount of the special severance payment offered to petitioner constituted section 104(a)(2) damages. Cf., e.g., Webb v. Commissioner, supra (payment made to departing IBM employee who signed a similar release was not sec. 104(a)(2) damages); Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1994) (similar result with respect to AT&T Communications, Inc., employee signing a “full legal release”). Therefore, since we have found that Boehringer simply extended the period during which petitioner could accept its original offer of a special severance payment, sweetening it a bit, the payment does not constitute section 104(a)(2) damagesPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Next
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