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have been reasonable for respondent to take the position that
petitioner was estopped from arguing that the automobiles and
personal property did not belong to it, and that it was not
independent. Respondent thus had a reasonable basis in both fact
and law for maintaining the position that the expenses deducted
by petitioner on account of the automobiles and other personal
items were not incurred as agent for Ohanesian and the related
entities.
Even if one were to assume that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel did not apply in the instant case, respondent was
entitled to require from petitioner cogent evidence of the
genuineness of an agency relationship. See Commissioner v.
Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 349-350 (1988), wherein the Supreme
Court stated:
the genuineness of the agency relationship is
adequately assured, and tax-avoiding manipulation
adequately avoided, when the fact that the corporation
is acting as agent for its shareholders with respect to
a particular asset is set forth in a written agreement
at the time the asset is acquired, the corporation
functions as agent and not principal with respect to
the asset for all purposes, and the corporation is held
out as the agent and not principal in all dealings with
third parties * * * [Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, petitioner alleged that an oral
agreement to pay personal expenses as an agent of the Ohanesians
existed, and that Ohanesian had de facto control over petitioner
even though he was not the nominative shareholder. In State
court, however, petitioner contended that the relationship
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