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In the present case, justice does not demand that we grant
petitioners' Motion for Leave.
First, we disagree with the assertion that the actions of
petitioners' counsel were "inadvertent". Rather, the record
clearly demonstrates that petitioners' counsel intentionally
delayed submitting petitioners' various motions until the eve of
the expiration of the 90-day period that typically leads to the
finality of a stipulated decision. Petitioners' counsel
intentionally delayed submitting the motions for what he regarded
as strategic reasons. Thus, it cannot be said that the actions
of petitioners' counsel were "inadvertent".
Second, we disagree that our Rules lack specific guidance
regarding the time when a claim for litigation costs should be
made. We have previously discussed at length the provisions of
our Rules regarding the time and manner of making a claim for
litigation costs, see Manchester Group v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-604, and we will not repeat that discussion herein.7
Suffice it to say that petitioners' counsel should not have
waited to file the instant motions until the 89th day after the
entry of the stipulated decision if he did not intend it to be
conclusive as to litigation costs. Rather, when respondent
7 Cf. Abatti v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 115, 119 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that a taxpayer's misunderstanding of the Tax
Court's Rules is insufficient to overcome the doctrine of
finality).
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