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separate and apart from its physical manifestation, the tapes.
In other words, by holding that the computer software in issue
was intangible property, this Court concluded that the
inextricable connection between the seismic data and the tapes
and film in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, supra, does
not exist between a computer program and its tangible residences.
In Comshare, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 1994),
the Sixth Circuit found no significant distinction between sound
waves and brain waves in relation to the physical embodiment of
any resulting information. The analysis made by the Sixth
Circuit brings into question the distinction relied on by us in
Ronnen v. Commissioner, supra, and prompts us to reexamine the
basis for that distinction.
For the purposes of applying the intrinsic value test as
interpreted by this Court, there is no fundamental difference
between seismic data and a computer program. Seismic data
theoretically exists in the geologic features of the subterrain
in the same way that a computer program theoretically exists in
the mind of its creator. Similar to a computer program, seismic
data may exist in various forms and occupy numerous tangible
residences in that it can be embodied in field tapes, output
tapes, analog film, or even seismic pictures. The compilation of
both types of information requires human exertion.
Those who see a distinction between seismic data and a
computer program may contend that the fundamental difference
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