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trademark. No other entity recorded or registered any rights to
the “g” trademark. After terminating its payments to Cremin upon
PepsiCo’s acquisition of an interest in Gamesa, petitioner
continued to distribute Gamesa’s products, and petitioner
continued to use the “g” trademark for advertising purposes.
These facts refute the claimed relationship between the funds
transferred by petitioner to Cremin and petitioner’s use of the
“g” trademark.
We note that PepsiCo, after acquiring an interest in Gamesa,
could not even determine which companies owned the rights to the
“g” trademark. PepsiCo simply required that all of the related
companies transfer back to Gamesa or otherwise cancel any and all
rights they may have owned to the “g” trademark.
Petitioner also has not established that it is customary for
a distributor to make payments similar to those involved in this
case relating to a manufacturer's products. We note that Mexican
distributors of Gamesa’s products did not make any similar
payments.
With regard to the $3,047,635 in funds transferred to Rubbik
during the years in issue, if in fact the funds represented
payment for services performed by Gamesa, petitioner has not
adequately explained why the funds were transferred to Rubbik,
and not to Gamesa. Petitioner’s claim that de la Garza served as
a broker of the services performed by Gamesa is not supported by
the evidence.
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