- 9 -
Robinson v. Commissioner, supra at 126; Stocks v. Commissioner,
supra at 10; Sodoma v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-275 (citing
Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994)). In this
connection, we have held that claims for potential future
personal injuries do not qualify for exclusion under section
104(a). Roosevelt v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77 (1964); Starrels
v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 646 (1961), affd. 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir.
1962). Such holdings imply that there must be an existing claim.
Moreover, while the claim need not have been previously asserted,
the absence of any knowledge of the claim on the part of the
employer-payor obviously has a negative impact in determining the
requisite intent of the payment. Sodoma v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-275; see also Keel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-
278; Foster v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-26.
Petitioner asserts that he had a bona fide claim against IBM
pursuant to the ADA for infliction of emotional distress, and
therefore IBM accepted his ITO II Program participation request
and subsequent release in lieu of litigation. In so arguing,
petitioner places heavy reliance on the Supreme Court's decision
in Commissioner v. Schleier, supra. In Schleier, the Supreme
Court noted that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort
liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to
compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the
violation of his legal rights." Id. at 335 (citing United States
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