- 9 -
cash or property) as a substitute for those payments, for any
period after the death of Ms. Raymond, sec. 71(b)(1)(D).
Nevertheless, Ms. Raymond takes the position that the 1991
temporary order payments, at least in part, also meet the defini-
tion of payments for child support in section 71(c). In support
of that position, Ms. Raymond contends: (1) The support stipula-
tion that was incorporated into the temporary order implies that
the 1991 temporary order payments are at least in part payments
for child support because it mentions the children of the
Raymonds by name and acknowledges that certain expenses were to
be incurred with respect to those children and that Ms. Raymond
was to have physical custody of Jessica Raymond on a temporary
basis; (2) Ms. Raymond used all or a portion of the 1991 tempo-
rary order payments to support the Raymonds' children; and
(3) the 1992 divorce judgments confirm that the 1991 temporary
order payments are at least in part payments for child support.3
Although the record supports the first two of Ms. Raymonds'
contentions, section 71(c)(1) nonetheless requires us to find
that the terms of the temporary order that incorporated the
3 Although Ms. Raymond appears to contend on brief that the
support stipulation that was incorporated into the temporary
order was not a valid, binding agreement, she conceded at the
trial of this case that "[the support stipulation that was
incorporated into the temporary order] is a binding agreement
which I did sign". The Probate Court considered the support
stipulation to be a valid, binding agreement which it incorpo-
rated into the temporary order that it entered in the Raymonds'
divorce proceedings pending a hearing on the merits or until
further order of that court.
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