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support stipulation do not fix either in terms of an amount of
money or a portion of the 1991 temporary order payments any part
of those payments as a sum that is payable for the support of the
children of Mr. Raymond.4 See Commissioner v. Lester, supra at
306. Inferences, intent, or other nonspecific designations of
payments as child support are not sufficient to override the
mandate of section 71(c)(1), see id., except as permitted by
section 71(c)(2). Section 71(c)(2) does not apply here because
there is no amount specified in the temporary order that was to
be reduced, let alone upon the occurrence of a contingency
specified in that order relating to a child of Mr. Raymond or at
a time that can clearly be associated with that kind of contin-
gency. See sec. 71(c)(2).
As for the third contention of Ms. Raymond that the 1992
divorce judgments confirm that the 1991 temporary order payments
are at least in part for child support, we find nothing in those
4 On Apr. 28, 1997, we denied Ms. Raymond's motion to reopen the
record in these cases to admit into evidence an order issued by
the Probate Court on Nov. 20, 1996 (1996 order) which denied a
motion filed with that Court by Ms. Raymond for "Court Definition
and Verification" that the 1991 temporary order payments were
payments for child support. Assuming arguendo that the 1996
order were part of the trial record in these cases, it would not
have changed our holdings. In this connection, we note that in
dictum in the 1996 order, the Probate Court stated: "The parties
entered into a stipulation which designated such contribution by
husband to wife as alimony and child support". Even if the 1996
order were part of the record herein, we would not be bound by
such dictum. In any event, on the record before us, we have
found that the temporary order did not designate that a portion
of the 1991 temporary order payments was alimony and that a
portion of such payments was child support.
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