- 6 -
858 (2d Cir. 1985), affg. in part and remanding Mandina v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-34. Petitioner, however, argues
that “there isn't any evidence at all that Respondent can furnish
to prove that Petitioner made a single dollar from drug
proceeds”, notwithstanding respondent's reliance on the plea
agreement and the statement of facts.1 Since this case involves
illegal unreported income, petitioner's assertion suggests that
Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981), affg. in
part, revg. in part and remanding 74 T.C. 260 (1980),2 applies
and requires respondent to satisfy the burden of coming forward
with evidence linking petitioner to an income-producing activity.
In the stipulation of facts, however, petitioner concedes that he
spent the amounts specified for the listed property.
Petitioner's concession necessarily acknowledges receipt of funds
to purchase the listed property and eliminates any threshold
requirement imposed by Llorente. See Tokarski v. Commissioner,
1 Petitioner also argues that he was assured that the plea
agreement and the statement of facts would not be used against
him in any other proceeding. This Court determined petitioner's
argument to be without merit and denied his motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction on Apr. 15, 1993. We see no need to
reconsider that decision.
2 In accordance with the doctrine of Golsen v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), we would
defer to Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981),
affg. in part, revg. in part and remanding 74 T.C. 260 (1980), if
that case were applicable and this case were appealable to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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