- 13 - and necessary business expenses (nor did Roy, Inc. substantiate a business purpose for such expenses). Even if, as the individual petitioners contend, some business purpose existed for Mohan Roy's use of the Rolls Royce (such as driving to hospitals to visit patients or perform surgeries), we cannot find any evidence in the record to support an estimate of the amount of business use as opposed to personal use. Cf. Henry Schwartz Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 728, 744 (1973). Moreover, Mohan Roy received a personal and economic benefit from driving a luxury automobile for commuting purposes. Cf. Erickson v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 525, 530-531 (9th Cir. 1979), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1976-147. Consequently, we hold that the individual petitioners received constructive dividends from Roy, Inc. as a result of Mohan Roy's use of the Rolls Royce automobile. See Connelly v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-436; Royce C. McDougal, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-64; William N. Smith, M.D., P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-426; Tyson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-122. We must next decide the amount of constructive dividends received by the individual petitioners. Mohan Roy testified thatPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
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