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Petitioners contend that under the principle of "equality,"
the Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly
situated taxpayers and cannot tax one and not tax another without
some rational basis for the difference. United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Baker
v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984); Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973).
According to petitioners, the principle of equality precludes the
Commissioner from making arbitrary distinctions between like
cases. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacating 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
The different tax treatment accorded petitioners and Miller
was not arbitrary or irrational. While petitioners and Miller
both invested in the Plastics Recycling transactions, their
actions with respect to such investments provide a rational basis
for treating them differently. Miller foreclosed any potential
liability for increased interest in his cases by making payments
prior to December 31, 1984; no interest accrued after that date.
In contrast, petitioners made no such payment and they conceded
that the increased rate of interest under section 6621(c) applies
in their cases. Liability for the increased rate of interest is
the principal difference between the settlement in the Miller
cases, which petitioners declined when they failed to accept the
piggyback agreement offer, and the settlement offer that
petitioners also failed to accept.
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