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as true the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner. See Davis v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 122, 141 (1987), affd. 866 F.2d 852 (6th
Cir. 1989); Estate of DeNiro v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 582, 584
(6th Cir. 1986), revg. T.C. Memo. 1985-128. Petitioner's
testimony, however, generally was credible, and we rely on
petitioner's testimony as it was supported by the record. See
Diaz v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 560 (1972) (basing analysis upon
evaluation of the entire record and the credibility of
witnesses); see also Estate of Neff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-186.
In the instant case, respondent relies on the settlement
checks which were made out to petitioner's law firm. The
evidence in the record indicating where the proceeds from those
checks went supports petitioner's explanation that, with certain
exceptions,4 Mr. Yoon converted the proceeds to his own use
without petitioner's knowledge. We conclude, therefore, that the
settlement checks cashed without petitioner's knowledge did not
constitute income to petitioner within the meaning of section 61.
Cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
The Mitsui Manufacturers Bank Client Trust Account
4 Petitioner admits that he authorized Mr. Yoon to cash
certain of the disputed checks, namely items 1, 2, 9, 13, 15 and
16. Petitioner contends that although up to one-third of the
gross amount of these checks could constitute gross receipts of
the firm, any such amount was given to Mr. Yoon as compensation.
Petitioner has failed to prove that any amount was paid as
compensation to Mr. Yoon.
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