- 42 -
see also Moser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-142 (allowing a
deduction for a single contribution to a VEBA which funded all of
the welfare benefits the VEBA was expected to pay), affd. on
other grounds 914 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1990).
Both sections 419 and 419A, in their attempt to end the
acceleration of deductions for contributions to VEBA's, refer to
the taxable year, or taxable yearend. These sections, by their
terms, do not deal specifically with a situation where the trust
and the employer use different taxable years, creating a gap in
the statutes. The regulation fills the gap by treating
contributions to a VEBA after the VEBA yearend but prior to the
taxpayer's yearend as being in the fund at the time of the VEBA
yearend.10
Because the regulation is consistent with the intent of
DEFRA, and because it permissibly fills a gap created by sections
419 and 419A, we conclude that section 1.419-1T, Q&A-5(b)(1),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 51 Fed. Reg. 4324 (Feb. 4, 1986), is
not impermissibly broader than sections 419 and 419A and,
accordingly, we hold that it is valid. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra. We have
10 Respondent also argues that the deduction limited by the
regulation would not otherwise be allowable, as required by sec.
419(a)(2), i.e., under secs. 162, 446, 461, and 7852, and that
therefore the regulation is valid. Because we hold that the
regulation is valid on other grounds, we do not address this
argument.
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