Douglass H. and Suzanne M. Bartley - Page 11

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          Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.  Johnson v. Robison, 415           
          U.S. 361, 364-365 n.4 (1974); Ward v. Commissioner, supra;                  
          Stevenson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-127.                             
               Under equal protection analysis, a classification in a Federal         
          statute is subject to strict scrutiny only if it interferes with            
          the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar             
          disadvantage of a suspect class.  Regan v. Taxation with                    
          Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Massachusetts Bd. of              
          Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); San Antonio Indep.          
          Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). Neither                  
          circumstance is present here. Wealth discrimination alone is                
          insufficient to require strict scrutiny; such review of wealth              
          classifications has been applied only where the discrimination              
          affects an important individual interest.  See, e.g., San Antonio           
          Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 24, 29; Harper v. Virginia         
          State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).                                
               Where a tax statute results in differing treatment of                  
          different classes of persons, the statute generally is not in               
          violation of the Fifth Amendment because of the different treatment         
          if it has a rational basis. Regan v. Taxation with Representation,          
          supra; United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S.         
          4 (1970).  Furthermore, it is especially difficult to demonstrate           
          that no rational basis exists for a classification in a revenue             
          measure for which the presumption that an act of Congress is                

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