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may not be avoided by an assertion of innocence. As
long as the guilty plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among alternative courses of action
open to the defendant, * * * and a sufficient factual
basis exists to support the plea of guilt, * * * the
collateral consequences flowing from an Alford plea are
the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea of
guilt. Were this not so, defendants pleading guilty
would routinely proclaim their innocence to reap two
benefits: (1) the avoidance of a trial and a possible
reduction in sentence, and (2) the extinguishment of
all collateral consequences of their plea. * * * [Blohm
v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (1993)(citations
omitted), affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-636.]
See also Yarbrough Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra; Lackey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-213.
In this case petitioner has not presented any evidence that
the plea was entered involuntarily. Additionally, petitioner's
arguments were thoroughly rejected by the District Court when
evaluating petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction. The
order of the District Court denying that motion was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stating "The court
found there was a factual basis for the plea and that the
movant's plea was entered freely and voluntarily, and with full
knowledge of the consequences of the plea".
Petitioner argues respondent is barred from asserting
collateral estoppel. Petitioner claims the Government waived
collateral estoppel under the plea agreement. Petitioner relies
on this pertinent language: "This agreement does not preclude Mr.
Boettner from pursuing any appeal rights he may have civilly with
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