- 24 -
(9th Cir. 1996) (considering the UFTA as adopted by the State of
Washington). Other Courts of Appeals, however, have addressed this
issue (albeit without great elaboration) and have applied the rule
in Summerlin to actions under the UFTA or other statutory
provisions, as well as actions under common law. See United States
v. Wurdemann, 663 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fernon,
640 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Moore, 968
F.2d 1099 (11th Cir. 1992). (The District Court in United States
v. Vellalos, supra at 708 n.3, criticized the decisions in Fernon
and Wurdemann as "an overly mechanical application of the dicta in
Summerlin without serious consideration of the significant
implications such a rule has for state sovereignty".)
The situation in Vellalos is factually distinguishable from
the situation herein. In Vellalos, the Government was unable to
invoke section 6901 because it missed the limitations period
prescribed by subsection (c). Therefore, it relied on State
foreclosure proceedings as a means for collection.9 (It is
unclear whether the District Court in Vellalos would have reached
its same conclusion had the Government proceeded timely under
section 6901.) Here, however, respondent has proceeded timely
9 In United States v. California, 507 U.S. 746, 758
(1993), the Supreme Court recognized that it is "a difficult
question" whether a State law action brought by the United States
is subject to Federal or State limitations periods. See Santiago
v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995); United States v.
Perrina, 877 F. Supp. 215, 218 n.5 (D.N.J. 1994).
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