Peter J. Bresson - Page 33

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          which an action must be brought and provides for the extinguishment         
          of the cause of action created by the CUFTA if those time limits            
          are exceeded.  In the case of a fraudulent transfer within the              
          meaning of section 3439.04(b), the cause of action is extinguished          
          unless an action is brought or a levy is made pursuant to section           
          3439.07 within 4 years after the fraudulent transfer is made.               
               B.  Section 3439.09                                                    
               Section 3439.09 is part of the CUFTA and, like the section             
          3439.07 remedies, it delimits the right (and offsetting transferee          
          liability) created by the CUFTA.  It delimits that right, however,          
          not in terms of specifying the available remedies, as does section          
          3439.07 but, rather, in terms of specifying the temporal dimension          
          of the right.  Section 3439.09 is not a statute of limitations.  It         
          does not operate by making the judicial mechanism unavailable to            
          enforce the right.  Rather, it delimits the existence of the State-         
          created right; thus, the question of enforcement is moot.  The              
          distinction between a statute of limitations and a temporally               
          delimited right is widely recognized.  See, e.g., Crandall v.               
          Irwin, 39 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ohio 1942), in which the Supreme Court           
          of Ohio held:                                                               
               A wide distinction exists between pure statutes of                     
               limitation and special statutory limitations qualifying                
               a given right.  In the latter instance time is made an                 
               essence of the right created, and the limitation is an                 
               inherent part of the statute or agreement out of which                 
               the right in question arises, so that there is no right                
               of action whatever independent of the limitation.  A                   
               lapse of the statutory period operates, therefore, to                  




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