- 39 -
United States v. Summerlin, supra at 417). Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished pure statutes of limitations from State-
created temporal rights.
D. Distinguishing a Temporal Right From a Temporal
Limitation
The cases cited from the Courts of Appeals by the majority in
order to further its approach do not address the issue of whether
a State can provide a limited temporal right, as opposed to
temporally limiting the sovereign from exercising a right that is
not otherwise so limited. See United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d
1099 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding without citation to the Georgia
statute in issue that the statute is a State statute of
limitations); United States v. Wurdemann, 663 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding without any analysis that State "statutes of
limitation" do not apply to the sovereign); United States v.
Fernon, 640 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Florida statute
section 95.11(6) to be a statute of limitations, and not an
element of a State-created right). I agree with the criticisms
made in United States v. Vellalos, 780 F. Supp. 705, 708 n.3 (D.
Haw. 1992), appeal dismissed 990 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1993), that
these cases are "an overly mechanical application of the dicta in
Summerlin without serious consideration of the significant
implications such a rule has for state sovereignty."3
3 There are numerous cases that deal with the question of
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