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to a present value. That approach does not serve to assist the
Court in measuring whether the parties were at arm’s length
and/or whether the value they used was a “fair market value”.
Petitioners’ expert’s approach to valuation begs the question and
is fatally flawed.
We are not constrained to follow the opinion of any expert
when the opinion is contrary to our own judgment. We may adopt
or reject expert testimony, whichever in our judgment is most
appropriate. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282,
295 (1938); Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.
1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285. We are not limited to choosing
the opinion of one expert over another but may extract relevant
findings from each in reaching our own conclusions. Chiu v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734 (1985).
Although respondent’s experts’ approaches were more
reasonable in terms of the rates used, we do not agree that the
value they have determined can be isolated as being attributable
to the trademark. In reaching that conclusion, we have, to some
extent, relied on petitioners’ experts, who opined that the DHL
network has value, over and above the stated equity, that should
be attributable to intangibles other than the trademark. In
particular, we find persuasive the concept that the DHL network
enjoyed an intangible benefit from its existing infrastructure
and operating know-how that created a “barrier to entry” of
others into the same marketplace. That principle was borne out
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