- 13 -
however, consider extrinsic evidence. Threlkeld v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. at 1306; Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107
(1983); Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680, 696 (1982), affd.
without published opinion 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984). We must
determine the nature of petitioners’ claims and the intent of the
payor (du Pont) in making the $500,000 payment. We look to
petitioners’ First Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand for
Jury Trial (the complaint) to determine the nature of their
claim. The complaint asks for damages and avers essential facts.
Petitioners claim that the Benlate they purchased was defective
and proved detrimental to their nursery products. They claim
that, as the direct and proximate result of their use of the
defective Benlate, among other things, they suffered damage to
their business reputation. They base their claims for damages
against du Pont on theories of strict liability in tort and
negligence. Nowhere in the complaint, however, do petitioners
use the term “personal injuries” to describe the injuries claimed
to have been suffered as the result of their use of Benlate.
Petitioners have not argued to us (nor do we believe) that
all injuries attributed to a defendant under a theory of strict
liability in tort or caused by a defendant’s negligence
necessarily are personal injuries within the meaning of section
104(a)(2). Moreover, as we said supra in section III.D.1.,
damage to business reputation is not, per se, a personal injury
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011