-7- petitioner is collaterally estopped by Anthony’s criminal tax conviction under section 7206(2) from denying that petitioner willfully understated its income on its 1988, 1989, and 1990 tax returns. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, once an issue of fact or law is “actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). This Court in Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990), set forth the following five conditions that must be satisfied prior to application of collateral estoppel in the context of a factual dispute: (1) The issue in the second suit must be identical in all respects with the one decided in the first suit. 5(...continued) respondent’s use of admissions from one docket in another docket. See Rule 90(f): “Any admission made by a party under this Rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by such party for any other purpose, nor may it be used against such party in any other proceeding.” To the same effect is Rule 91(e). Cf. New v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1146 (1989) holding motions to vacate Rule 37(c) orders would be judged by the same standard applied to a Rule 90(f) motion. Marshall v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267, 273 (1985), holding that deemed admissions under Rule 90(c) were sufficiently similar to deemed admission under Rule 37(c) so as to satisfy respondent’s burden for summary judgment.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011