-7-
petitioner is collaterally estopped by Anthony’s criminal tax
conviction under section 7206(2) from denying that petitioner
willfully understated its income on its 1988, 1989, and 1990 tax
returns.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, once an
issue of fact or law is “actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action
involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). This Court in Peck v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167 (1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525
(9th Cir. 1990), set forth the following five conditions that
must be satisfied prior to application of collateral estoppel in
the context of a factual dispute:
(1) The issue in the second suit must be identical in
all respects with the one decided in the first suit.
5(...continued)
respondent’s use of admissions from one docket in another docket.
See Rule 90(f): “Any admission made by a party under this Rule is
for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an
admission by such party for any other purpose, nor may it be used
against such party in any other proceeding.” To the same effect
is Rule 91(e). Cf. New v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1146 (1989)
holding motions to vacate Rule 37(c) orders would be judged by
the same standard applied to a Rule 90(f) motion. Marshall v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267, 273 (1985), holding that deemed
admissions under Rule 90(c) were sufficiently similar to deemed
admission under Rule 37(c) so as to satisfy respondent’s burden
for summary judgment.
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