-9-
See Spruance v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141, 156 (1973), affd.
without published opinion 505 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1973). We
continue to apply this approach.6 Respondent has not argued that
we should overrule these precedents and has not contended that
these precedents do not apply where the earlier ruling was a
section 7206(2) conviction rather than a section 7201 conviction.
Nevertheless, respondent cites United States v. Crooks, 804
F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Ross v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1988-283; Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-
74, affd. 458 F.2d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); and Bertoli v.
Commissioner, 103 T.C. 501 (1994), as support for the application
of collateral estoppel to petitioner. None of these cited
opinions supports respondent’s motion.
In United States v. Crooks, 804 F.2d at 1448 (9th Cir.
1986), the Court of Appeals discussed what the Government must
prove in order to convict under section 7206(2). The Court of
Appeals concluded that the evidence in that case was sufficient
to support the conviction. The Court of Appeals’ opinion does
not deal with the question we face in the instant case--whether
Anthony’s conviction under section 7206(2) can collaterally estop
petitioner--Forkston Fireworks Mfg. Co.--from denying that
petitioner filed a false tax return. However, at 1446-1447 the
6 Yarbrough Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1993-20.
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