- 12 -
agreements are not subject to the consistent settlement provision
of section 6224(c)(2).
Participants argue in the alternative that the regulation is
invalid insofar as it adds restrictions that are inconsistent
with section 6224(c)(2). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), the
Supreme Court set forth the following analysis:
If * * * the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. [Fn. refs.
omitted.]
We have already concluded that the statute is silent as to the
scope of consistent settlements. Under the Chevron analysis, the
question remains whether the requirements in section 301.6224(c)-
3T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., supra, are a permissible
construction of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra.12
12
As a general proposition, temporary regulations are
accorded the same weight as final regulations. Peterson Marital
Trust v. Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996), affg. 102
T.C. 790 (1994); Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
765, 776 (1987). In judging the validity of a temporary
regulation, we employ the same analysis as that applied to a
final regulation. Schaefer v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 227, 229
(1995).
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