- 17 -
discussed, here there is neither an unambiguous specific
statutory directive, nor any specific evidence in the legislative
history as to the congressional intent behind the consistent
settlement provisions.
In sum, section 301.6224(c)-3T(b), Temporary Proced. &
Admin. Regs., supra, harmonizes with section 6224(c)(2) and the
broader legislative purpose behind TEFRA, and we conclude that
the regulation constitutes a permissible interpretation of the
statute. Accordingly, we uphold the validity of the regulation
as neither arbitrary, capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the
statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. at 844.16
15(...continued)
of section 103(c)"); State of Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
656, 672 (1981), affd. 692 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Arrow
Fastener Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 423, 431 (1981) ("we find
the statute clear and unambiguous, and respondent has no power to
promulgate a regulation adding provisions that he believes
Congress should have included.").
16 Participants argue that respondent provided them with
the necessary information regarding each of the original
settlement agreements, fully aware that participants sought the
information for the purpose of making requests for offers of
consistent settlement terms. Therefore, participants suggest
that respondent should be estopped from now claiming that the
original settlement agreements are not subject to requests for
consistent settlement terms.
Equitable estoppel is a judicial doctrine that precludes a
party from denying that party's own acts or representations which
induced another to act to his or her detriment. Hofstetter v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 695, 700 (1992). Equitable estoppel is to
be applied against respondent only "'with utmost caution and
restraint.'" Id. at 700 (quoting Estate of Emerson v.
(continued...)
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