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conditions, or statements of intent. Therefore, the payment
satisfies the definition of lump-sum alimony as provided by the
Supreme Court of Georgia. In addition, the divorce decree does
not refer to the payment merely as "alimony" as respondent
claims, but specifically as "lump sum alimony". As lump-sum
alimony, Human's obligation to pay petitioner $750,000 would not
have terminated had petitioner died before payment. Therefore,
the payment did not satisfy the definition of alimony under
section 71 and could not be includable in petitioner's income.
Respondent was in possession of this information before the
issuance of the notice of deficiency. The only adjustments made
to petitioner's 1992 return in the notice of deficiency were an
addition of $750,000 to petitioner's income and a penalty under
section 6662 of $48,118. The notice of deficiency stated that
these adjustments were made "due to a whipsaw issue between * * *
[petitioner] and a related party."
We have previously recognized the propriety of respondent's
assuming inconsistent positions between former spouses regarding
payments incident to divorce under certain circumstances. See
Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982); Warnack v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541, 547-548 (1979). Respondent argues
that inconsistent positions were required here because Human took
the position that his payment to petitioner in 1992 was alimony
deductible by him and includable in petitioner's income. We
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