- 6 -
requirements set forth in section 71(b)(1)(D) have been
satisfied. In that connection, petitioner maintains that "even
though there is no stipulation that the * * * [payments]
terminate upon the death of Mrs. Human * * *, this is implied."
For reasons which follow, we agree with respondent.
Pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec.
1843(b), 100 Stat. 2853, a divorce or separation instrument
executed after December 31, 1984, need not expressly provide for
the termination of payments upon the death of the payee spouse in
order for such payments to be treated as alimony, provided that
such termination is implied under State law. Notice 87-9, 1987-1
C.B. 421, 422. Thus, we must turn to Georgia law for guidance as
to whether an obligation to make the contested payments remained
on the part of petitioner in the event of Anita's death. See
Sampson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 614, 618-619 (1983), affd.
without published opinion 829 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1987).
Georgia law recognizes alimony as either periodic or lump
sum. Winokur v. Winokur, 365 S.E.2d 94, 95 (Ga. 1988). "Lump
sum alimony" may be payable in specified installments or at once.
Stone v. Stone, 330 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ga. 1985). In Winokur v.
Winokur, supra at 96, the Georgia Supreme Court defined lump-sum
alimony as follows:
If the words of the documents creating the obligation
state the exact amount of each payment and the exact
number of payments to be made without other
limitations, conditions or statements of intent, the
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011