Albert Lemishow - Page 4

                                        - 4 -                                         
                    (3) Those with respect to which a penalty has been                
               imposed at a 40 percent rate (i.e., a penalty for gross                
               valuation misstatement under section 6662(b)(3) and                    
               (h)).                                                                  
                    (4) Those with respect to which a penalty has been                
               imposed at a 75 percent rate (i.e., a penalty for fraud                
               under section 6663).  [Sec. 1.6664-3(b), Income Tax                    
               Regs.]                                                                 
          Respondent's computation of the penalty is in accordance with               
          these rules and the implementing examples.  Petitioner offers an            
          alternative computation which he claims complies with the                   
          statute.                                                                    
               In reviewing a regulation, we consider two questions as set            
          forth by the Supreme Court:                                                 
               First, always, is the question whether Congress has                    
               directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If                  
               the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the                
               matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give                
               effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of                        
               Congress.  * * * if the statute is silent or ambiguous                 
               with respect to the specific issue, the question for                   
               the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a                 
               permissible construction of the statute.  [Chevron                     
               U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,                     
               Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984); fn. refs. omitted.]                
          These principles were very recently reaffirmed by the Supreme               
          Court in Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S.    ,              
          , 118 S. Ct. 1413, 1418 (April 21, 1998), with the additional               
          admonition:                                                                 
               the task that confronts us is to decide, not whether                   
               the Treasury regulation represents the best                            
               interpretation of the statute, but whether it                          
               represents a reasonable one.  See Cottage Savings Assn.                
               v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 560-561 (1991).  * * *                  






Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011