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full and complete satisfaction of all claims of the defendant
[Marilyn] in connection with equitable distribution.” He also
finds support in the New York court’s discussion of other
property transfers in proximity to its discussion of the $50,000
payment.
Petitioner relies on ambiguity as his defense. In his post-
trial memorandum, petitioner states:
It has always been our position, and indeed our
original planned strategy, that the nature of the
$50,000 payment was not characterized in open court.
The stipulation was therefore silent on that matter.
The invitation by the divorce court to submit a more
particularized document left open the issue of post
spousal death liability therefor, to be addressed, if
at all, by supplementation of the agreement then
recorded. This was never done.
Apparently, petitioner believed that, if the $50,000 payment was
not labeled “an equitable distribution”, he might have been able
to avoid his obligation to make that payment if Marilyn died
after they were divorced and before any payment was made.
Nevertheless, petitioner admits: “[M]any might come to the
conclusion that the $50,000 payment was in the nature of
equitable distribution”.
3. Analysis
The $50,000 payment was made pursuant to the settlement
stipulation and, although incorporated into the judgment of
divorce, it cannot be characterized as an amount “awarded by the
court” within the meaning of N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law sec. 236B(1)(a)
(“maintenance”) or (b) (“distributive award”). Cf. Kaplan v.
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