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(1992), where the Court said: "There is no indication in any of
the House or Senate hearings on the bill or in the reports of
either congressional branch that would indicate that a
distinction should be made that section 131 only applies if a
tax-exempt agency is State funded."
We find that the intent of Congress as expressed in the
pertinent legislative history comports with the plain meaning of
the language in section 131. The record in this case makes it
clear that enrollees in the ElderPlace program who were in
petitioners' foster home were "placed by" ElderPlace in the home
according to the ordinary use and plain meaning of the verb "to
place".
The individuals placed in petitioners' home by ElderPlace
were not qualified foster individuals because they were not
placed by an agency of the State or a political subdivision
thereof. Because the ElderPlace enrollees were not qualified
foster individuals, amounts paid to petitioners for providing
care for them cannot be qualified foster care payments.
Medicaid Policy
Petitioners further argue that a finding by the Court that
section 131 does not cover their payments from ElderPlace would
produce "absurd results" and that the future of this experimental
program would be imperiled. The example of "absurd results"
cited by petitioners is the case where a foster home resident
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