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petitioner's statutory approach with respect to the COD income
exclusion provision because it is simply not plausible. In this
instance, section 108(d)(7)(A) explicitly provides that the COD
income exclusion operates, for purposes of the subchapter S
regime, on the corporate level. Absent any legislative
indication to the contrary, we are required to apply the
provision as we find it in accordance with its plain meaning.
United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534,
543-544 (1940).
In that regard, it is well established that a specific
statutory provision will override a general provision. Bulova
Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753 (1961); D. Ginsberg &
Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). Hence, we
believe that section 108(d)(7)(A) regulates the treatment of
excluded COD income in the context of the subchapter S regime
(i.e., sections 1363(a), 1366(a), and 1367(a)). In the same
vein, the exceptions delineated in section 1366(f) are not
material or applicable since they do not implement the COD income
exclusion in the context of the subchapter S regime.
The literal language at issue here provides that the
reduction in tax attributes applies at the corporate level. Sec.
108(d)(7)(A). We do not interpret section 108(d)(7)(A) in a
narrow manner. Here, we construe the provision to mandate that
insolvency is determined--and COD income is excluded from gross
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