Catherine H. Poole, f.k.a. Catherine H. Dames - Page 13

                                        -13-                                          
          for a division of the assets of petitioner and Dr. Ibach ("the              
          parties shall make the following transfers and payments in an               
          effort to equitably distribute their estate").  The only payments           
          at issue, however, are those pursuant to Paragraph 7.                       
               As indicated, great weight is given to the language and                
          structure of the decree.  See Griffith v. Commissioner, supra.  The         
          language of Paragraph 7 is explicit:                                        
                    As settlement of all claims the Wife may have                     
                    for temporary and permanent alimony, Husband                      
                    shall pay to Wife the lump sum of $500,000 * *                    
                    * The parties' intent is that this is lump sum                    
                    alimony, payable over a period of more than                       
                    ten (10) years as provided in section 71(c),                      
                    Internal Revenue Code. Said sum * * * shall be                    
                    deductible by Husband and taxable to Wife.                        
          This factor favors treating the payments as alimony.                        
               With regard to the second factor, petitioner surrendered               
          valuable property rights valued at or greater than $500,000,                
          including: The Mandarin Road marital home; the South Ponte Vedra            
          beach house; Dr. Ibach's profit sharing and pension plan;                   
          investments; and tax shelters.  However, once she relinquished her          
          rights to these properties under Paragraphs 9c, 9d, 10, 11, and 12,         
          it does not appear that she had any further rights in tangible              
          property  to  exchange  for  the  Paragraph  7  payments.    See            
          Schottenstein v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 451, 461 (1980).  Thus, this         
          factor favors treating the payments as alimony.                             








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