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It is clear, however, that to distinguish advertising
campaign expenditures from advertising execution expenditures
solely on the basis of the taxpayer's expectations regarding the
duration of the expected benefits is insufficient to require
capitalization of an advertising expenditure. See sec. 1.162-
1(a), 20(a)(2) (providing for the general deductibility of
"goodwill" advertising); supra sec. I.C.3. So long as all of the
benefits resulting from advertising campaign expenditures are
among the traditional benefits associated with ordinary business
advertising, the regulations, as interpreted by respondent’s own
ruling, Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, preclude capitalization.
Nevertheless, respondent argues that advertising campaign
expenditures (and, likewise, the litigated expenses) create
intangible assets and benefits that are not among the benefits
traditionally associated with ordinary business advertising
(e.g., goodwill). Respondent describes those benefits of
advertising campaign expenditures as certain “legal rights and
economic interests” of a long-term nature. Respondent identifies
the pertinent legal rights as the Federal statutory rights and
common-law trademark rights that attach to “trade dress”, a term
that the courts have used to describe, “essentially * * * [the]
total image and overall appearance” of a product. See Philip
Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), and authorities cited therein. Respondent
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