- 22 -
holding, we noted that "the state of the IRS' computer
capabilities is such that a computer search of the information
retained with respect to a certain taxpayer, including their last
known address, may be performed by respondent's agent without
unreasonable effort or delay." Id. at 1033.
Here, the IRS' computer system did not provide the ability
to conduct within a reasonable time a cross-check of the
taxpayer's income tax, WPT, and employment tax returns that would
have revealed the taxpayer's change in corporate status, using a
single EIN. Thus, Abeles v. Commissioner, supra, while
analogous, is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand.
Finally, we address Energy's argument that respondent easily
could have determined that New Petroleum had merged out of
existence by checking with the Delaware secretary of state, which
as of December 17, 1991, had the certificate of merger on file.
In making this argument, Energy relies on Badger Materials, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 725, 733 (1963), withdrawn and modified
in part by Badger Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 1061
(1963) for the proposition that filing of merger documents with
the secretary of state constitutes notice of merger to the IRS.
We disagree and find Energy's reliance on Badger Materials, Inc.
to be misplaced. In Badger Materials, Inc., the taxpayer
corporation was dissolved and generally ceased to exist.
Following the dissolution, the treasurer of the defunct
corporation executed consents purporting to extend the period for
assessment of Federal income tax. Within the period of
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