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recipient's income. See sec. 88 (nuclear decommissioning costs
are "includible" in gross income).
Judge Ruwe's dissent uses the word "included" in section
83(a) to construe the word "included" in section 83(h). Although
the choice of "included" or "includible" in section 83(a) would
not affect our reading of that subsection, Judge Ruwe's dissent's
substitution of "includible" for "included" in section 83(h)
would dramatically change the meaning of that subsection.
From the fact that Congress might have accomplished its
purpose in section 83(a) equally well by saying "includible"
instead of "included", Judge Ruwe reasons that Congress meant
"includible" in section 83(h) where it used "included". Judge
Ruwe's dissent pp.39-40. The dissent in essence relies on the
maxim of statutory construction that if Congress uses the same
term in two places in the statute, we should give it the same
meaning.
Maxims of construction are useful interpretative tools but
are not dispositive. The dissent overlooks the different purpose
and context of sections 83(a) and (h). The same word or phrase
appearing in different places in the internal revenue laws may
have different meanings depending on the context and legislative
purpose involved. See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293
U.S. 84, 86-88 (1934); Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121,
128 (1934). The context of section 83(a), an income inclusion
provision, is different than section 83(h), a deduction
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