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BEGHE, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part:
Judge Ruwe’s concern (see his dissenting op. p. 53) over the
unsatisfactory result his correct analysis seems to require and
my own sense that there must be more to this fully stipulated
case than either side chose to present has led me to review the
record made by the parties. My review of the record raises such
troubling questions that I am impelled to set them forth, with
supporting references to their sources in the record and
petitioner’s brief, in the face of the views of my colleagues and
the courts that judges must refrain from trying to tell
respondent how to do his job. See, e.g., United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737-738 (1980).
1. Why didn’t respondent issue statutory notices of
deficiency to petitioner’s employees who received Endotronics
shares as compensation?1
1 Petitioner’s brief suggests that the employees may not
have reported the receipt of the shares as income because the
shares were “letter stock” under the Federal securities laws and
could not be sold on the public market without a registration
statement for a 2-year period following receipt. The suggestion
appears misplaced in two respects: (1) It was clear at the time
the shares were received that letter stock is not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture under sec. 83(a) and that letter
stock restrictions do not postpone the receipt of income, as
demonstrated by the cases cited in petitioner’s brief, decided
prior to the receipt of the shares, see Pledger v. Commissioner,
641 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981); Robinson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1985-275; Phillippe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-30;
Cassetta v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-384, see also Robinson
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 444, 467 (1984) (sec. 83(c)(3) is not in
issue here); Horwith v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 932 (1979); Grant
(continued...)
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