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OPINION
I. Estoppel
We must first decide whether respondent is equitably
estopped from determining additional estate taxes against
petitioner. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the
Government may not be estopped on the same grounds as a private
person. See OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990); Heckler
v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). It is well
established that the estoppel doctrine should be applied against
the Commissioner with the utmost caution and restraint. See
Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 214-215 (1981), affd. 810
F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 612, 617 (1977).
The traditional elements of estoppel include:
(1) Conduct constituting a [mis]representation of
material fact; (2) actual or imputed knowledge of such
fact by the representor; (3) ignorance of the fact by
the representee; (4) actual or imputed expectation by
the representor that the representee will act in
reliance upon the representation; (5) actual reliance
thereon; and (6) detriment on the part of the
representee. * * * [Graff v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743,
761 (1980).]
See Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, 60 (1995);
Hudock v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 351, 363 (1975). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which the present case is
appealable, requires two additional elements in order to estop
the Government: (1) Affirmative misconduct going beyond mere
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