- 9 - order ceased. The manufacturing equipment belonged to Pacer, not petitioners, until July 1988, as evidenced by the July 1988 agreement transferring the equipment from Pacer to Venco. It was not until September 1988 that Venco transferred the equipment to petitioner, as evidenced by the bill of sale dated September 10, 1988, which also expressly reconfirms that title to the equipment was not transferred from Pacer to Venco until July 1, 1988. Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner’s involvement with the manufacturing activity in question--which activity was confined to the first 2 months of the 4 years at issue and involved equipment still owned by Pacer--was in his capacity as shareholder and manager of Pacer, and not in his individual capacity. Generally, a taxpayer may not deduct expenses incurred or paid on behalf of another taxpayer. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493-494 (1940). Similarly, a shareholder ordinarily may not deduct expenses incurred as an investor in a corporation. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 199-200, 203 (1963). At trial, petitioners sought to establish through parol evidence that, notwithstanding the unambiguous documentary evidence to the contrary, petitioner actually acquired the equipment from Venco in 1987. Petitioners argue that Venco actually purchased the metal fabrication equipment from Pacer in 1987 and that in the fall of 1987, petitioner entered into anPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
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