- 7 -
every case, and no one factor is controlling. See Abramson v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360, 371 (1986); Allen v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 28, 34 (1979); sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners state that at the time the notice of deficiency
was issued,3 "there was no reasonable factual basis to support
[respondent's] determination that petitioners did not engage in
the business of horse racing and breeding with an intent to make
a profit." We disagree. Cases involving section 183 are almost
entirely factual in nature and require a weighing of factors, all
of which may be reasonably interpreted differently. See Brennan
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-60; Eldridge v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1996-44; Harrison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-
295; Leaphart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-502, affd. without
published opinion 31 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir. 1994); Jasienski v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-449.
In the underlying case, we were required to weigh carefully
all the facts and circumstances and consider each of the factors
listed in the regulations promulgated under section 183.
Although we agreed with petitioners in the underlying case, there
were certain factors present that were indicative of an activity
not engaged in for profit. Notwithstanding our conclusion that
petitioners did have the requisite profit objective, the presence
3Respondent's position in the administrative proceeding was
the same as in the judicial proceeding. This is immaterial,
however, since petitioners do not seek administrative costs.
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