Jerry and Patricia A. Dixon, et al - Page 134




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          misconduct, the judgment can be upheld as harmless error."                  
          DuFresne v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d at 107.                                   
               The term "structural defect" normally refers to the                    
          violation of a fundamental constitutional right occurring during            
          a criminal trial that affects the very framework within which the           
          trial proceeds, so that the trial cannot reliably serve its                 
          function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.              
          See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra at 309-310.  The presence of a             
          structural defect in a criminal trial requires  automatic                   
          reversal of the conviction and a new trial.  See, e.g., id.;                
          Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).                                  
               Significantly, not all constitutional errors occurring                 
          during a trial result in a structural defect in the proceedings.            
          To the contrary, there are a number of constitutional errors,               
          characterized as lesser "trial errors", that are susceptible to             
          harmless error analysis.                                                    
          In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), a plurality                  
          opinion, the Supreme Court discussed the distinction between a              
          constitutional violation that causes a structural defect in a               
          trial and a constitutional violation that is subject to harmless            
          error analysis.  A majority of the Justices concluded that the              
          admission of the defendant's coerced confession at his murder               
          trial did not constitute a structural defect requiring automatic            
          reversal of the defendant's conviction.  However, a separate                
          majority further concluded that the defendant was entitled to a             
          new trial because the State of Arizona had failed to meet its               

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