- 215 -
unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race
from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986); the right to self-representation at trial,
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-178 n.8 (1984);
and the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 49, n.9 (1984). Each of these constitutional
deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather
than simply an error in the trial process itself.
"Without these basic protections, a criminal trial
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S., at 577-578 (citation omitted).
Id. at 306-310.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently relied
upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. Fulminante, supra,
to support its holding that a defendant's absence from the
courtroom when the jury returned the death sentence did not
result in a structural defect in the proceedings. See Rice v.
Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals
further concluded that the error was harmless because the
defendant's absence from the courtroom did not have a
"substantial and injurious effect or influence" in determining
the jury's verdict. Id. at 1144 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946))).
B. Arguments
Messrs. Izen and Jones argue that the Government misconduct
in these cases resulted in a structural defect on the ground
that their clients, both test case and nontest case petitioners,
were deprived of a fair trial. Messrs. Izen and Jones argue that
Page: Previous 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011