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served its fundamental function as the vehicle for redetermining
the tax liabilities of the broad array of test case petitioners
represented by Mr. Izen.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Sticht's argument that the Court
effectively was precluded from supervising the trial of the test
cases because Judge Goffe was not informed of the Thompson and
Cravens settlement agreements. Judge Goffe was aware that
Messrs. Thompson and Alexander were hostile towards Mr. Kersting.
Although a disclosure of the Thompson and Cravens settlements and
the Alexander understanding would have given Judge Goffe a more
comprehensive basis for weighing their credibility, we do not
equate Judge Goffe's lack of knowledge of the settlements with
the proposition that he was precluded from supervising the trial
of the test cases. To the contrary, the record in the trial of
the test cases and the evidentiary hearing shows that Judge Goffe
accurately assessed the credibility of Messrs. Thompson, Cravens,
Alexander, and Kersting and maintained firm control of the
proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit cases that Mr. Sticht relies upon for the
proposition that the nondisclosures to the Court precluded Judge
Goffe from supervising the trial of the test cases are readily
distinguishable from the facts at hand. In United States v.
Noushfar, 78 F.3d at 1144-1145, the Court of Appeals held that
there was a structural defect in a criminal trial in which the
trial judge abdicated control of the presentation of evidence by
allowing the jury to take into the jury room tapes of the
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