- 268 -
In sum, District Courts are vested with discretion to relieve a
party from a final judgment where the adverse party has committed
a fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. See Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th
Cir. 1957).
Although the decisions in these cases are not final, the
parties seem to agree that these proceedings may be analogized to
proceedings under rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. We will assume for present purposes that the analogy
is valid in light of the apparent agreement of the parties.
A judgment may be set aside under rule 60(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where fraud, misrepresentation,
or misconduct prevents a party from fully and fairly presenting
his or her case at trial. See In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403,
1405 (9th Cir. 1987); Simons v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th
Cir. 1983); Bunch v. United States, 680 F.2d at 1283; Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Barrett, supra at 849. Relief does
not depend on whether the judgment is incorrect, only on whether
the judgment was obtained unfairly. See Lonsdorf v. Seefeldt, 47
F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862
F.2d at 924 n.10.
Some courts have held that the willful presentation of
perjured testimony is grounds for granting the innocent party a
new trial pursuant to rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 497 (5th
Cir. 1995). However, it has been said that
Page: Previous 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011