Jerry and Patricia A. Dixon, et al - Page 202




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          677-678;114 Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster                  
          Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Toscano v.            
          Commissioner, supra at 934.  In this regard, not all fraudulent             
          or deceptive acts constitute fraud on the Court.  It has been               
          said that fraud on the court concerns egregious conduct affecting           
          the ability of the court to function impartially.  See Broyhill             
          Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., supra at             
          1085-1086, and cases cited therein.                                         
               Since the Supreme Court's decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.            
          v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra, a number of courts, including the            
          Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have relied upon or                 
          adopted the definition of fraud on the court set forth in                   
          12 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, par. 60.21[4][a], at 60-52              
          (3d ed. 1998), which states:                                                
                    "Fraud on the court" is defined in terms of its                   
               effect on the judicial process, not in terms of the                    
               content of a particular misrepresentation or                           
               concealment.  Fraud on the court must involve more than                
               injury to a single litigant; it is limited to fraud                    
               that "seriously" affects the integrity of the normal                   
               process of adjudication.  Fraud on the court is limited                
               to fraud that does, or at least attempts to, "defile                   
               the court itself" or that is perpetrated by officers of                
               the court "so that the judicial machinery can not                      
               perform in the usual manner its impartial task of                      
               adjudging cases".  [Fn. refs. omitted.]                                




          114  In Drobny v. Commissioner, 113 F.3d 670, 678 (7th Cir.                 
          1997), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-209, the Court of Appeals for the              
          Seventh Circuit held that the taxpayers were required to                    
          demonstrate "not only that the respondent engaged in conduct that           
          was intended to mislead the court, but--of paramount importance--           
          that the actual conduct affected the outcome of their case."                

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