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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (interpreting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on which Rule 121 was modeled); Espinoza v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982). With respect to issues on
which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the
party moving for summary judgment may satisfy his burden "by
'showing'--that is, pointing out to the * * * [trial] court--that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra at 325. In deciding
whether to grant summary judgment, we view the facts and the
inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986); Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821
(1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).
On this record, we must grant respondent's motion for
summary judgment. Respondent's motion is grounded upon a
complete lack of evidence in the record regarding the factual
issues raised by the petition and on concessions deemed admitted
under Rule 90.3 As the parties with the burden of proof at
trial, see Rule 142(a), petitioners could not defend against
respondent's motion for summary judgment by silence; they had an
3Six out of the seven requests for admissions were requests
for concessions of legal liability. Whether such requests are
proper under Rule 90 is an issue we need not decide since the
record before us is sufficient to grant respondent's motion for
summary judgment without relying on the concessions.
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