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Stendig v. United States, 843 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1988), no
deduction is allowed. Thus, section 461(f) does not apply.
Finally, petitioner argues that the fees he received from
clients were excludable because there was a chance that the court
would order the fee refunded to the client. There is some
evidence in the record relating to petitioner’s argument; namely,
petitioner’s testimony and the testimony of an employee at the
Clerk of Court for Charleston County indicating that the judge in
a case has discretion to order fees returned. On the other hand,
there is no evidence in the record establishing the circumstances
(including, for instance, the frequency) of returned fees. But
there is a more basic defect with petitioner’s argument; namely,
exclusion of fees until resolution of any contingencies regarding
their return was not the method of accounting that petitioner
employed. Rather, the method he actually used was entirely
different: under his method, he excluded all amounts deposited
into the accounts, regardless of whether any fees so deposited
were subject to return or not. Thus, this argument must fail.
We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit. We accordingly sustain respondent’s
determination that petitioner was required to include in income
in 1992 the combined balances in the Charleston County, U.S.
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