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purpose, authorities include statutory and regulatory provisions,
legislative history, administrative interpretations of the
Commissioner, and court decisions, but not conclusions reached in
treatises or legal periodicals. See Booth v. Commissioner, 108
T.C. 524, 578 (1997); sec. 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners' position is not supported by any well-reasoned
construction of the relevant statutory provisions. The cases
petitioners have cited on brief are readily distinguishable and,
to the extent they are pertinent, undermine their position.
Cases that are factually distinguishable are not substantial
authority. See Antonides v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 686, 702-703
(1988), affd. 893 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Estate of
Reinke v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir. 1995), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1993-197. We have rejected the factual basis of
petitioners' claim, and, thus, the authority they cite is not
relevant to the facts of this case and cannot constitute
substantial authority.
Petitioners assert that they adequately disclosed the tax
treatment of the attorney’s fees and guaranties. The adequate
disclosure requirement can be satisfied by providing information
that "reasonably may be expected to apprise the Internal Revenue
Service of the identity of the item, its amount, and the nature
of the potential controversy". Sec. 1.6661-4(b)(3), Income Tax
Regs.; see also Cramer v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 225, 255 (1993),
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