Marie A. Gonzales - Page 6

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          (3) the instrument does not designate the payment as nonalimony;             
          (4) the spouses reside in separate households; (5) the spouses do            
          not file a joint return; and (6) the payor's liability does not              
          continue for any period after the spouse's death.  See sec.                  
          71(b)(1), (e).  The payment in question must meet each criterion             
          in order for it to be alimony.                                               
               The parties agree that the disputed payments meet the first             
          five criteria enumerated above.  We, therefore, concern ourselves            
          with the last requirement; i.e., the termination-at-death provi-             
          sion.  See sec. 71(b)(1)(D).  The dispositive question is whether            
          Dr. Gonzales had any "liability to make * * * [family support                
          payments] for any period after * * * [petitioner's] death * * *              
          and * * * [any] liability to make any payment (in cash or prop-              
          erty) as a substitute for such payments after * * * [her] death".            
          Id.  If the payor is liable to make even one otherwise qualifying            
          payment after the recipient's death, none of the related payments            
          required before death will be alimony.  See sec. 1.71-1T(b),                 
          Q&A-13, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34456 (Aug. 31,             

               6Although some parts of the temporary regulations have been             
          superseded by amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, this Q&A              
          has not been affected.                                                       
               We also note that temporary regulations have binding effect             
          and are entitled to the same weight as final regulations.  See               
          Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 790, 797 (1994),            
          affd. 78 F.3d 795 (2d. Cir. 1996); Truck & Equip. Corp. v.                   

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