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(3) the instrument does not designate the payment as nonalimony;
(4) the spouses reside in separate households; (5) the spouses do
not file a joint return; and (6) the payor's liability does not
continue for any period after the spouse's death. See sec.
71(b)(1), (e). The payment in question must meet each criterion
in order for it to be alimony.
The parties agree that the disputed payments meet the first
five criteria enumerated above. We, therefore, concern ourselves
with the last requirement; i.e., the termination-at-death provi-
sion. See sec. 71(b)(1)(D). The dispositive question is whether
Dr. Gonzales had any "liability to make * * * [family support
payments] for any period after * * * [petitioner's] death * * *
and * * * [any] liability to make any payment (in cash or prop-
erty) as a substitute for such payments after * * * [her] death".
Id. If the payor is liable to make even one otherwise qualifying
payment after the recipient's death, none of the related payments
required before death will be alimony. See sec. 1.71-1T(b),
Q&A-13, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34456 (Aug. 31,
1984).6
6Although some parts of the temporary regulations have been
superseded by amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, this Q&A
has not been affected.
We also note that temporary regulations have binding effect
and are entitled to the same weight as final regulations. See
Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 790, 797 (1994),
affd. 78 F.3d 795 (2d. Cir. 1996); Truck & Equip. Corp. v.
(continued...)
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