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In Gerlach v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 156, 169 (1970), however, we
did not apply either the Danielson rule or the strong proof rule
to a case involving a settlement incorporated into a divorce
decree. Because Gerlach v. Commissioner, supra, arose under
section 71 as in effect before the effective date of DEFRA, we
looked to all of the facts and circumstances to determine whether
the payments were intended by the parties to the settlement
agreement to be alimony or a property settlement. See id.
However, as we discussed above, after 1984, the inquiry under
section 71 is whether the objective factors of section 71 are
met.
Petitioner is essentially asking this Court to rewrite the
settlement agreement in order to meet the requirements of section
71. Petitioner contends that reformation of the settlement
agreement is appropriate because petitioner's attorney and former
husband fraudulently obtained her assent to the terms of the
settlement agreement. She bases her contention on the assertion
that her attorney and her former husband concealed information
concerning her former husband's true worth. At trial, however,
petitioner did not produce any admissible evidence in the instant
case to corroborate such fraud. Moreover, petitioner has not
asked the Georgia courts to reform or void the settlement
agreement. Rather, petitioner has pursued remedies available to
her under the terms of the settlement agreement to obtain further
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