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equitable distribution". As such, respondent contends, the
withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe did not constitute alimony because the
agreed order does not satisfy section 71(b)(1)(A). Respondent
further argued that, although the later divorce decree did
characterize the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe as alimony pendente
lite, the divorce decree is dated September 13, 1994, and,
therefore, could not retroactively make or define the prior
withdrawals as deductible alimony.
Respondent's second position was that the agreed order of
September 4, 1992, provided that Mr. Jaffe "shall be responsible
for income taxes due on the amount which is ultimately
adjudicated to have been alimony pendente lite". Respondent
argued that this language constituted a designation under section
71(b)(1)(B) that the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were not includable
in her gross income and were not deductible by Mr. Jaffe.
Mr. Jaffe's position, asserted in a pretrial memorandum, as
well as in his testimony at trial, was that the alimony order
dated September 13, 1994, stated unequivocally that the
withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were alimony pendente lite and that
statement alone entitled him to an alimony deduction.
Ms. Jaffe argued that the withdrawals were a division of the
marital estate and, therefore, did not constitute alimony.
The Court notes that the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were made
out of the Vanguard account, which constituted marital property
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