- 10 - equitable distribution". As such, respondent contends, the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe did not constitute alimony because the agreed order does not satisfy section 71(b)(1)(A). Respondent further argued that, although the later divorce decree did characterize the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe as alimony pendente lite, the divorce decree is dated September 13, 1994, and, therefore, could not retroactively make or define the prior withdrawals as deductible alimony. Respondent's second position was that the agreed order of September 4, 1992, provided that Mr. Jaffe "shall be responsible for income taxes due on the amount which is ultimately adjudicated to have been alimony pendente lite". Respondent argued that this language constituted a designation under section 71(b)(1)(B) that the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were not includable in her gross income and were not deductible by Mr. Jaffe. Mr. Jaffe's position, asserted in a pretrial memorandum, as well as in his testimony at trial, was that the alimony order dated September 13, 1994, stated unequivocally that the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were alimony pendente lite and that statement alone entitled him to an alimony deduction. Ms. Jaffe argued that the withdrawals were a division of the marital estate and, therefore, did not constitute alimony. The Court notes that the withdrawals by Ms. Jaffe were made out of the Vanguard account, which constituted marital propertyPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Next
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